How NASA budgets collide in the next decade
by John G. Stewart
Pundits suggest that President Bush's recent announcement of returning to the moon and then going on to Mars within the next several decades is his attempt to deal with the "vision thing" that so bedeviled his father.
But to have credibility, "visions" must have some grounding in reality. Here is where the Bush vision runs into trouble. Not only that, but the funding scenario released by NASA also raises worrisome concerns about the safety of the Space Shuttle when it returns to service later this year.
Supporters of space exploration, such as I, welcomed announcement of a goal that will take astronauts beyond the confines of low earth orbit (about 300 miles up). Despite two decades of spinning, NASA never could generate much public excitement over the International Space Station (ISS). Space Shuttle flights, although highly risky, became increasingly routine due to their repetitious nature. Bush's announcement fixed all that.
What it didn't fix is where the money is to be found to support such a lofty vision. Bush and NASA studiously avoided giving any estimate as to costs.
But what are the backs of envelopes for? Let's see: the Apollo program cost about $99 billion in 2003 dollars. Add to this base number the cost of completing the International Space Station, now estimated to be about $30 billion. Assume that a permanent moon base would cost about the same as completing the ISS and you arrive at a total number of about $150 billion for returning humans to the moon. Not a cent in this estimate for Mars exploration, you understand. And this is a very conservative estimate.
What does Bush propose? It's hard to say this with a straight face. He wants to add $1 billion over five years ($200 million/year) and then reallocate $11 billion of NASA's current budget. Not only is the total number of $12 billion a joke in terms of what really will be required, it raises the gravest concerns over where the $11 billion of reallocated funding will come from.
In other words, if this scenario is supposed to deal effectively with the "vision thing," a return to the drawing boards would seem to be in order. It's curious, not to say remarkable, that the moon/Mars initiative wasn't even mentioned in the State of the Union address. So much for vision.
The worrisome dimension of the Bush proposal has received almost no attention in the media. It is simply this: How can the Space Shuttle return safely to flight if there are insufficient funds to carry out the extensive safety improvements set forth by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel?
The budget diagram provided by NASA to illustrate Bush's proposal tells the frightening story. The funding line for the Space Shuttle—the single largest program in NASA's budget—slowly declines from 2004 to 2010 when the Space Shuttle will be retired. This is the reallocated money that will make its way, more than likely, to the moon mission.
It will take more money, not less, to ensure an acceptable level of safety when the Space Shuttle makes between 25-30 more scheduled flights. These flights cannot be carried out safely without extensive upgrades to the Shuttle's aging systems and technology.
This conclusion arises from my more than two decades (1980-2001) of involvement with NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), as both a panel member and consultant.
As panel members, we took our responsibilities seriously. We talked directly to the managers, engineers, and technicians responsible for operation of the Space Shuttle and construction of the International Space Station. We turned over rocks and looked for the truth.
As the '90s unrolled, we became progressively more alarmed over the funding shortfalls that prevented Space Shuttle managers from moving ahead with a long list of safety upgrades that we, and they, thought were necessary to keep this aging and complex vehicle safe to fly over the long run.
Beginning in the late 1990s, workforce cuts eliminated thousands of the trained people needed to keep this error-prone and unbelievably complicated machine flying safely. We strongly spoke out in opposition to this personnel downsizing. The ASAP mantra has always been: "Safety first; schedule second." Pressures to complete the International Space Station by 2004, as set forth by the current NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe, seemingly turned this principle on its head.
NASA agreed in writing with most of our recommendations, just as it has to those of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). Agreeing is one thing, but actually doing them is quite another. Increasingly, serious action by NASA on the ASAP's recommendations fell victim to budget shortages.
But we persisted. In June 2001, a group of us on the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel were sufficiently annoying about these recommendations that NASA kicked us off the panel. Who can say whether our ignored recommendations, if implemented, would have created a safety environment where the Columbia tragedy could have been avoided? A question worth pondering.
John G. Stewart, a Knoxvillian and former chairman of Tennesseans for Fair Taxation, is the former staff director of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology & Space.
February 12, 2004 • Vol. 14, No. 7
© 2004 Metro Pulse
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